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Introduction and Summary
Mathematical models in operations management addressing procurement decisions often make the simplistic assumption that the prices for the items to be purchased are exogenously given. For example, the celebrated newsvendor model typically assumes a given purchase price. The plethora of inventory models in the literature also make a similar assumption, although the quantity decisions there often come with a dynamic°avor. In reality, procurement managers often need to discover the prices for the items they want to buy, and this may involve market research, negotiations, auctions/bidding, etc. Procurement models in economics, on the other hand, tend to focus on price discovery,¯xing quantity decisions. But, as we will see, an optimal procurement strategy typically requires integrating price discovery with quantity decisions by embedding a supply contract in an auction.
This paper considers a model with one buyer and multiple, potential suppliers.
The buyer's operations require an input (e.g., a component) that must be purchased from one of the suppliers. The buyer's revenues are an increasing, concave function of the input quantity. The suppliers each privately observe their marginal cost of production; the buyer only knows the common probability distribution that generated the suppliers' marginal costs. The goal is to identify a procurement strategy that maximizes the buyer's expected pro¯ts. This model provides a simple setting to study the integration of the quantity decision for a single item and the discovery of its price. Dasgupta and Spulber (1989/90) have studied the above model. They show that the following bidding mechanism is optimal. The buyer¯rst announces a quantitypayment schedule, which speci¯es an amount the buyer will pay for each possible value of input quantity. This is a supply contract the buyer o®ers on a take-it-orleave-it basis. The suppliers then engage in a sealed, high-bid auction, where they submit (input) quantity o®ers. The supplier with the highest bid (i.e., quantity o®er) wins the auction, produces and delivers his bid, and receives a payment according to the pre-announced quantity-payment schedule. We use quantity auctions to refer to procurement strategies where competitive bidding takes place in the quantity space.
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The above sealed, high-bid auction represents only one, albeit optimal, way to carry out a quantity auction. A natural question is if quantity auctions remain optimal under other auction formats. We consider several well-known auction formats, i.e., Vickrey, English, and Dutch auction, and¯nd that Dutch auction is equivalent to sealed, high-bid auction (they are both optimal), while English auction dominates Vickrey auction. Thus Vickrey auction is suboptimal. It is unclear whether or not English auction is optimal. (Preliminary results suggest that it is not.) In short, the optimality of a quantity auction depends on the auction format used.
Another key result of the paper is the establishment of a di®erent class of optimal procurement strategies, which we refer to as price auctions. As in quantity auctions, the buyer¯rst announces a quantity-payment schedule. It is also announced that a single supplier will be chosen and given the freedom to choose the input quantity to deliver to the buyer. Knowing these rules, the suppliers participate in an auction where they submit price o®ers, i.e., prices they are willing to pay for the right to supply. One advantage of price auctions is that they are insensitive to the auction format used: English auction, Dutch auction, sealed, high-bid auction, and Vickrey auction are all optimal. Moreover, the optimal quantity-payment schedule, i.e., the buyer's payment as a function of the delivered quantity, is increasing, concave, and independent of the number of suppliers. Finally, under mild conditions, the optimal quantity-payment schedule for price auctions can be written as widely used supply contracts such as returns contracts or revenue-sharing contracts. Quantity auctions, on the other hand, do not have these features.
The above one-buyer, multiple-suppliers model can be viewed as a generalized newsvendor model with supply-side competition. The traditional newsvendor model, where the purchase price for the input is exogenously given, is often used to illustrate the value of risk pooling, the practice of combining di®erent inventory locations and pooling their demands. The generalized model thus provides a means to shed new light on the value of risk pooling. In general, the value of risk pooling is not a monotone function of supply-side competition (measured by the number of suppliers).
where the suppliers are usually the ones to set the price-quantity relationship, by, e.g., quoting a quantity-discount schedule, and the buyer then optimizes her purchasing decisions given the suppliers' quotes. See, e.g., Sadrian and Yoon (1994) for discussions on real-world procurement systems.
But if the pro¯t margin for the newsvendor's product is high (a precise de¯nition is given later), the value of risk pooling decreases as supply-side competition increases.
The trend is reversed if the margin is low.
The generalized newsvendor model can also be used to quantify the value of perfect demand information, which is de¯ned to be the increase in the buyer's expected pro¯ts if the procurement decision can be made after demand is observed. (Note that after demand is realized, only price discovery remains.) Put di®erently, we are interested in the increase in the buyer's expected pro¯ts as she switches from maketo-stock to make-to-order. As it turns out, the value of perfect demand information is qualitatively equivalent to the value of risk pooling and thus exhibits the same dependency on supply-side competition.
The¯nal topic this paper addresses is how the allocation of quantity decision rights a®ects the buyer's pro¯ts. To this end, we modify the generalized newsvendor model by introducing a spot market, where additional input can be procured at a signi¯cantly higher price at the end of the selling season. Production by a supplier, if any, must occur before the selling season. Three scenarios are considered. In thē rst scenario, denoted by BMI (buyer managed inventory), the buyer¯rst makes the quantity decision and then uses an auction to seek the lowest-cost supplier. Therefore, the quantity decision and price discovery are treated sequentially. At the end of the season, the buyer has the option to purchase additional supplies from the spot market. In the second scenario, denoted by VMI (vendor managed inventory), the buyer delegates the quantity decision to the winning supplier, who is responsible for satisfying the buyer's demand (by, if necessary, purchasing from the spot market).
An auction determines which supplier wins the VMI contract and the fee received by the winning supplier for his service. The third scenario, denoted by SDR (shared decision rights), is somewhere in between the¯rst two, because the quantity decision comes from both sides of the trade. Here the buyer runs an auction before the selling season that produces an input quantity and the corresponding payment. Therefore, price discovery and the quantity decision are integrated (instead of being considered sequentially as in BMI). But, as in BMI, the buyer has access to the spot market at the season's end. It is shown that the buyer prefers SDR to VMI to BMI, although only VMI can maximize the expected system-wide pro¯ts.
This work is related to several streams of research. The theory of auctions has grown tremendously since Vickrey's (1961) seminal paper. It is carefully documented in McAfee and McMillan (1987a) and, more recently, Klemperer (1999) . The operations literature on supply contracts is surveyed in several articles in Tayur et al. (1998) . Our contributions lie at the interface between these two bodies of work. La®ont and Tirole (1993) provide a comprehensive treatment of di®erent aspects of procurement. See also Elmaghraby (2000) for a discussion of papers on sourcing strategies from both economics and operations. The issue of price discovery has received some attention in the operations literature. A market-clearing mechanism is used to determine prices in Mendelson and Tunca (2000) and Lee and Whang (2002) . Gallien and Wein (2000) consider an auction design problem in a complex procurement setting with multiple items and capacity constraints, whereas the main goal here is to identify optimal procurement strategies in a much simpler model. Several papers have considered integrating an incentive contract with an auction, see, e.g., La®ont and Tirole (1987) , McAfee and McMillan (1986, 87b) , and Riordan and Sappington (1987) . The setting considered is one with one principal and multiple agents. The principal has a project, for which the agents compete. Each agent possesses private information and his action is unobservable to the principal. The solution is to auction o® an incentive contract among the agents. Finally, the integration of a supply contract with an auction has been studied to various degrees. The contribution of Dasgupta and Spulber (1989/90) has already been mentioned. Hansen (1988) and Jin and Wu (2000) are more restrictive in the sense that the forms of their supply contracts are exogenously given.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers a special case of the model to set the stage for the remainder of the paper. Section 3 studies in detail quantity auctions and price auctions and how they compare. Section 4 investigates the value of risk pooling, and Section 5 the value of perfect demand information.
Section 6 addresses quantity decision rights.
Single-Unit Reverse Auctions
Suppose a¯rm is in a position to acquire a single unit of a product and after some processing, to sell it at a price p. For convenience, we normalize the processing cost to zero. (Alternatively, the processing cost is already included in the selling price p.) There are n, n¸2, suppliers, and each of them can produce a single unit of the product. The suppliers' costs of production are independent draws from a common probability distribution F (c), c 2 [c; c], which is di®erentiable with F (c) = 0 and F (c) = 1. Let c i be supplier i's production cost, i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n. Assume that each supplier only sees his own cost, and the¯rm (also referred to as the buyer) does not know any of the cost values other than the fact that they all come from the distribution F . The task facing the buyer is to maximize her expected pro¯t, which is the di®erence between p and the price paid for the input in the event of a trade.
(If a trade does not occur, her pro¯t is zero.) We refer to the above scenario as a single-unit, reverse auction. To avoid confusion, we will use the term \standard auctions" to refer to settings with one seller and many potential buyers.
The above scenario of procurement can be translated into a standard auction (of selling) that is well understood in the economics literature. Assume the¯rm has already collected the price p. Suppose the object for sale is \the right and obligation to supply one unit of the product to the¯rm." The¯rm is the seller of this object, and the suppliers are the potential buyers. Let v i be supplier i's valuation of the object, i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n. If supplier i gets the object, he incurs a cost of c i . Hence v i = ¡c i . The reservation value of the object to the¯rm is v 0 = ¡p, which is how much the object is worth to the¯rm if it is not sold, i.e., no suppliers have been found to deliver the input and the¯rm has to \produce" the product by itself at cost p, e®ectively returning the money it previously collected. The¯rm's objective is now to maximize her expected revenue (which is going to be negative). This is known as an independent, private-value auction, with well-known optimal designs. The¯rm's maximum expected pro¯t is thus p plus the maximum expected revenue.
Let F v (¢) be the cumulative distribution function of v i , i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n. Thus
where v = ¡c and v = ¡c. The standard auction is regular if
is increasing in x (Myerson 1981) . Note that J(x) = ¡H(¡x) wherẽ
Thus the above regularity condition holds if and only ifH(¢) is an increasing function, which we assume throughout the paper. Clearly, a su±cient condition for this assumption is that
is increasing in x or equivalently, F is logconcave. Many probability distributions are logconcave, including the Beta distribution, which has the uniform distribution as a special case. See Rosling (2002) for an extensive discussion on logconcave probability distributions and further references on the topic.
The optimal design of the above standard auction is well known. It calls for thē rm to set a reserve price v ¤ , which represents the minimum bid acceptable to the
The following common auction forms are all optimal:
English auction, Dutch auction,¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction, and Vickrey auction.
For example, in English auction, the object will be sold to the highest bidder if the highest bid exceeds the reserve price, and no deal otherwise. In Vickrey auction, the seller herself (i.e., the¯rm) submits a bid v ¤ . The highest bidder gets the object and pays the second highest bid. The¯rm's maximum expected pro¯t is
where the¯rst term is the price p the¯rm has already collected, and the remaining terms represent the¯rm's expected revenues in the standard auction (see equation (11) of Riley and Samuelson (1981) ). Now return to the procurement setting. Let c ¤ be the mirror image of v ¤ , i.e.,
p >H(c), c ¤ = c; and if p <H(c), c ¤ = c. Still call c ¤ the reserve price. (The symbol c ¤ will be used throughout the paper. Although its meaning is always the maximum marginal cost below which a supplier will¯nd it worthwhile to participate in an auction, its exact de¯nition depends on the context.) The optimal design for the standard auction can be easily translated back to the procurement setting. For example, in English (procurement) auction, the suppliers openly bid down the price charged for the¯rm's input, with the lowest bidder as the winner so long as the bid is not above c ¤ . The¯rm's maximum expected pro¯t, given by (2), can be simpli¯ed to a more intuitive form.
we can write the buyer's maximum expected pro¯t as
where
is the probability density function of C 1 def = minfc 1 ; c 2 ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; c n g. The range of the integral is obvious: if C 1 exceeds the reserve price, there will be no deal, leaving the buyer with zero pro¯ts. On the other hand, if C 1 is below the reserve price, then there will be a trade where the¯rm pays a virtual costH(C 1 ) to the lowest-cost supplier. Note that the virtual cost is higher than the true cost, i.e.,H(C 1 ) > C 1 , with the increment being the information rent collected by the winning supplier. For example, if F is a uniform distribution with c = 0, then the virtual cost is 2C 1 , representing a 100% markup. Interestingly,
where C 2 is the second lowest cost (see Appendix I).
Variable-Quantity Reverse Auctions
Suppose the¯rm's input quantity, denoted by Q, is a decision variable. Given Q units of input, the¯rm can generate revenue R(Q), which is assumed to be strictly concave and increasing in Q with R(0) = 0. (Thus the single-unit case is a special case with Q = 1 and p = R(1).) We shall retain all the assumptions made earlier about the suppliers and their costs. Below, we explore various auction designs and their impact on the¯rm's pro¯ts.
Quantity Auctions
Dasgupta and Spulber (1989/90) have provided an optimal solution to the variablequantity problem. It requires the buyer to¯rst announce a quantity-payment (here-after QP) schedule P (¢), i.e., the buyer pays P (Q) for Q units of input for any possible value of Q. Knowing P (¢), the suppliers each provide a quantity o®er in a sealed bid.
The supplier who bids the maximum quantity wins the contract, produces and delivers his bid, and receives a payment from the buyer according to P (¢). (The other suppliers do not produce and do not receive any payment from the buyer.) Dasgupta and Spulber show that with a properly chosen P (¢), the above auction implements a direct mechanism they found by solving a direct revelation game. The auction's optimality thus follows by invoking the revelation principle.
We shall use quantity auctions to refer to procurement strategies where the suppliers compete by submitting quantity o®ers. The Dasgupta-Spulber design is therefore a quantity auction conducted in the sealed, high-bid format. Below, we consider this and other auction formats.
Sealed, High-Bid Auction
Here we re-derive the quantity auction suggested by Dasgupta and Spulber. The reader will see that once we con¯ne ourselves to quantity auctions of the sealed, highbid form, it is easy to obtain an optimal solution. And with our understanding of the single-unit, reverse auctions, the solution is almost obvious. This complements the direct-revelation-game approach used by Dasgupta and Spulber.
Let P (¢) be the QP function announced by the buyer. The suppliers then play a game of incomplete information (due to their private cost information), for which the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is an appropriate solution concept. Assume that there is a symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy; this is plausible since the suppliers One immediate observation is that there is a trade as long as C 1 • c ¤ . The expected system-wide pro¯ts can be expressed as
since given C 1 = x, R(Q(x)) is the system's revenue and xQ(x) the system's production cost. To derive the buyer's expected pro¯ts, it only remains to determine the suppliers' expected pro¯ts.
Take any i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n. Suppose all the suppliers but supplier i play the strategy Q(¢). Consider the problem facing supplier i. In order for Q(¢) to be an equilibrium strategy, it must be the case that supplier i can do no better than bidding Q(c i ), for all c i 2 [c; c ¤ ]. In particular, supplier i gains nothing by bidding Q(x), for some x 6 = c i , which is the same as playing the strategy Q(¢) but pretending that his marginal cost is x. Take any c 2 [c; c ¤ ], and suppose c i = c. Let ¼ i (x; c) be supplier i's expected pro¯t if he bids Q(x) while his marginal cost is c, given that all the other suppliers play Q(¢). Note that
is the supplier's pro¯t if he wins the auction (by bidding
n¡1 is the probability that every other supplier's marginal cost is greater than supplier i's \reported" marginal cost x, which implies that Q(x) is the highest bid. In order for ¼ i (x; c) to be maximized at x = c, it is necessary that
Using the above equation to simplify
Because the suppliers are symmetric, the sum of the expected pro¯ts of the suppliers is n times the above expression.
The di®erence between (4) and nE[¼ i (c)] is the buyer's expected pro¯ts:
Note that as in single-unit, reverse auctions,H(C 1 ) again emerges as the virtual marginal cost of procurement for the buyer.
De¯ne
from (7) that the buyer's expected pro¯ts are maximized if Q ¤ (¢) arises as a BayesianNash equilibrium in the auction. This is indeed achievable, and the corresponding QP function is easy to derive. Note from (5) that
Using (6) to replace ¼ i (c) in the above equation and solving for P (Q(c)):
Replacing Q(¢) with Q ¤ (¢), one can solve for the optimal QP function P ¤ (¢). It can The following theorem summarizes the above development, where the optimality result is due to Dasgupta and Spulber.
Theorem 1 (Dasgupta and Spulber) In the sealed, high-bid, quantity auction with
is a common Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy for the suppliers, and the buyer's expected pro¯ts are
which is the maximum achievable by the buyer among all procurement strategies.
Several observations are immediate. The amount of input the buyer actually purchases is Q ¤ (C 1 ), a decreasing function of the lowest marginal cost C 1 . Therefore, as competition intensi¯es, i.e., as n grows, C 1 becomes stochastically smaller, leading to a stochastically larger purchase quantity. Moreover, as expected, the buyer's expected pro¯ts increase with more supply-side competition. To see this, de¯ne ¦(x) = max Q¸0 R(Q) ¡H(x)Q, a decreasing function of x becauseH(x) is increasing in x. As n grows, C 1 becomes stochastically smaller, increasing E[¦(C 1 )], the buyer's expected pro¯ts. Finally, note that the e±cient trade between the lowestcost supplier and the buyer, the one that maximizes their joint gains, is Q 0 (C 1 ),
for all x, and hence asymmetric cost information causes ine±ciencies by reducing the trade. This is reminiscent of the well-known double-marginalization phenomenon 2 : while C 1 is the system's marginal cost,H(C 1 ) is the e®ective \wholesale price."
A simple example of a variable-quantity, reverse auction is the newsvendor problem with supply-side competition. Suppose the¯rm is a retailer (or newsvendor), who buys a product from one of the suppliers and re-sells it to her customers. Let Q be the input quantity. The selling price to the customers is p per unit, which is exogenously given. The total customer demand is D, a random variable with cumulative distribution function G(¢). Demand is realized after the input quantity is determined.
If demand exceeds supply, the excess demand is lost. Otherwise, the excess supply is useless and can be disposed of at no cost. The total quantity sold to customers is thus minfQ; Dg. The buyer's expected revenue is
Clearly, this function is concave and increasing with R(0) = 0. Therefore one can use the above results to design an optimal procurement strategy for the newsvendor.
The newsvendor problem is used frequently for the rest of the paper.
Example 1: Consider the newsvendor problem. Suppose both F and G are uniform distributions between 0 and 1. Let p = 2. We will refer to this speci¯c instance as the double-uniform newsvendor problem. In this case,
Also
2 , a concave function that is maximized at Q = n+1 2n < 1. The fact that P ¤ (Q) can decrease in Q, although awkward, is necessary for optimality.
Vickrey Auction
Now consider a Vickrey (quantity) auction. That is, as before, the suppliers submit quantity o®ers in sealed bids, and the winner is the highest bidder. But the quantity produced by the winning supplier and delivered to the buyer is equal to the second highest bid. If the delivered quantity is Q, then the buyer pays P (Q) to the winning supplier, where P (¢) is a QP schedule that the buyer has announced before the auction.
Does Vickrey auction maximize the buyer's expected pro¯ts?
We shall restrict ourselves to QP functions P (Q), Q¸0, that are continuous with P (0) = 0. We also require the following single-crossing property: for any c 2 [c; c], if P (q) > cq for some q, then the function P = P (Q) crosses the linear function P = cQ from above exactly once in the range Q > 0. Let Q(c) now be the crossover point.
Thus P (Q(c)) = cQ(c), i.e., a supplier with marginal cost c breaks even if he sells Q(c) units to the buyer. Moreover, it is easy to see that the breakeven quantity is decreasing in c. If the two functions, P (Q) and cQ, do not cross in the range Q > 0, set Q(c) = 0, which is also a breakeven quantity for a supplier with such a marginal cost. This may occur when c is high. A direct consequence of the single-crossing property is that a supplier with marginal cost c makes a pro¯t only if the quantity traded is below his breakeven quantity.
It is well known that in standard auctions, the optimal design often requires a reserve price. In this spirit, we allow the buyer to set a \reserve quantity" denoted by q ¤ , which is the minimum acceptable bid. For implementation, imagine that the buyer herself submits a (quantity) bid of q ¤ . If the bids from the suppliers are all below q ¤ , then there is no trade. Otherwise, the quantity traded is the greater of q ¤ and the second highest bid (of the suppliers). Let c ¤ be such that Q(c ¤ ) = q ¤ , i.e., a supplier with marginal cost c ¤ breaks even at the reserve quantity.
The bidding game the suppliers play is a game of incomplete information. Thus a supplier's bidding strategy is a mapping from his marginal cost c to a quantity he is indi®erent. Otherwise, he loses the auction, whereas before, his pro¯ts were nonnegative. The buyer's task is to choose a QP schedule P (¢) and a reserve quantity q ¤ (or equivalently, a reserve cost c ¤ ) to maximize her expected pro¯ts.
As noted above, Q(c) is decreasing in c. Therefore in the above dominant strategy equilibrium, the lowest-cost supplier's bid is always the largest. If and only if the largest bid is greater than q ¤ , there is a trade. More speci¯cally, if Q(C 1 ) < q ¤ or equivalently C 1 > c ¤ , then there is no trade and the buyer's pro¯ts are zero.
Otherwise, the quantity traded is q = maxfq ¤ ; Q(C 2 )g, where C 2 is the second lowest cost, and the buyer's pro¯ts are R(q) ¡ P (q). If q = q ¤ , P (q) = c ¤ q ¤ . Else, P (q) = C 2 Q(C 2 ). Therefore, we can express the buyer's expected pro¯ts as
where f (2)j(1) (¢jx) is the conditional density function of C 2 given C 1 = x, which can be found in Appendix I. The above expression can be simpli¯ed to read:
where f (2) (¢) is the probability density function of C 2 . The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 1 Hereafter, we restrict Q(¢) to Q 0 (¢) and c ¤ to be less than or equal to c 0 . It only remains to determine the optimal value of c ¤ . Consider the following expression
From (1), we have
It is easily veri¯ed that
Consequently,
The second integral can be simpli¯ed by integrating by parts and using the fact that
, and the third integral can be written more explicitly by replacing f (1) (x) with n(1 ¡ F (x)) n¡1 F 0 (x). After these steps, we have W = ¦. This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If Q 0 (¢) is the breakeven quantity, the buyer's expected pro¯ts can be written as the right-hand-side of (9). Consequently, the optimal reserve cost c ¤ satis¯es
Example 2: Consider the double-uniform newsvendor example. It is easy to verify
The corresponding QP function is P (Q) = 2Q(1¡Q).)
which is a convex function that crosses the x axis at x = 2 3 and x = 2. Therefore c ¤ = 2 3
. The buyer's maximum expected pro¯ts under the Vickrey auction are therefore
If n = 2, then f (1) (x) = 2(1 ¡ x), and the above integral amounts to Theorem 2 The Vickrey-quantity auction can be strictly suboptimal.
English Auction
So far, we have only considered sealed-bid auctions. Alternatively, the buyer can run an auction where the suppliers openly submit quantity o®ers. For example, the buyer rst announces a QP schedule and then invites the suppliers to an open auction, with the winner being the supplier holding the highest (quantity) bid. The winning supplier produces and delivers his bid and receives a payment determined by the preannounced QP schedule. This is an English (quantity) auction, a topic we now turn to.
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Let P (¢) be the pre-announced QP schedule. Assume P (0) = 0. As in the Vickrey auction, we restrict ourselves to QP functions with the single-crossing property. Here we further require that P (¢) be strictly concave. As mentioned, the single-crossing property implies that for a supplier with marginal cost c, there is a unique breakeven quantity, denoted here by Q e (c), that satis¯es P (Q e (c)) = cQ e (c), for all c 2 [c; c].
Moreover, the strict concavity ensures that there is a unique (noncompetitive) optimal quantity for each supplier, i.e., Q o (c) def = argmax Q¸0 P (Q) ¡ cQ for a supplier with marginal cost c. The following properties are immediate:
is decreasing in Q for Q¸Q o (c) and becomes negative for Q > Q e (c), and both Q e (c) and Q o (c) are nonincreasing in c.
As in the Vickrey auction, the buyer imposes a reserve quantity q ¤ . The buyer seeks to choose P (¢) and q ¤ to maximize her expected pro¯ts. Unfortunately, this turns out to be a hard problem. But it can be shown that the English auction dominates the Vickrey auction.
Recall from Lemma 1 that the optimal QP schedule for the Vickrey auction is one where the breakeven quantity for a supplier with marginal cost c is equal to Q 0 (c).
Let P 0 (¢) be this QP function, which satis¯es P 0 (Q 0 (c)) = cQ 0 (c) for all c 2 [c; c].
Lemma 3 R(Q) ¡ P 0 (Q) is increasing in Q for Q > 0.
Proof: Di®erentiating both sides of P 0 (Q 0 (c)) = cQ 0 (c)with respect to c,
On the other hand, from the de¯nition of Q 0 (c), R 0 (Q 0 (c)) = c for all c with Q 0 (c) > 0. Now take any Q > 0. Suppose Q = Q 0 (c) for some c 2 [c; c]. Therefore,
supplier indicates that he is willing to deliver a quantity named by the auctioneer. The buyer takes the delivery and pays the winning supplier according to a pre-announced QP function. It is not hard to see that the Dutch auction is strategically equivalent to the sealed, high-bid auction considered above. The arguments resemble those used to establish the equivalence between the two auction formats in standard auctions, see, e.g., Vickrey (1961) .
where the inequality is due to the strict concavity of R(¢).
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Assume that P 0 (¢) is strictly concave. And consider the following feasible solution in the English auction: the buyer pre-announces P 0 (¢) as the QP schedule and sets q ¤ equal to the optimal reserve quantity in the Vickrey auction. Below, we compare this feasible solution with the optimal solution in the Vickrey auction.
Let Q E (resp., Q V ) be the quantity traded in the English (resp., Vickrey) auction.
First, note that if C 1 > c ¤ , there will be no deal in either auction, i.e., Q E = Q V = 0.
(Recall that c ¤ is such that Q e (c ¤ ) = q ¤ .) Now suppose C 1 • c ¤ . In this case, recall that Q V = maxfq ¤ ; Q 0 (C 2 )g. For the English auction, consider two cases.
Case 1: Q o (C 1 )¸Q e (C 2 ). In this case, the lowest-cost supplier can essentially start the auction with a bid at Q o (C 1 ) and no other suppliers will be interested in participating in the auction because it is already beyond their breakeven quantities.
Case 2: Q o (C 1 ) < Q e (C 2 ). The second-lowest cost supplier remains in the auction as long as the current bid is below Q e (C 2 ). Consequently, the winning bid must exceed Q e (C 2 ). But in this range, the lowest-cost supplier's pro¯t, P (Q) ¡ C 1 Q, is decreasing in Q because it starts to decrease at Q o (C 1 ). It then follows that
Summarizing the above two cases, we have
where the last equality follows since Q e (c) = Q 0 (c) for all c. This, together with Lemma 3, shows that the buyer's pro¯ts under the English auction, R(Q E ) ¡ P (Q E ), are at least as high as those under the Vickrey auction, R(Q V ) ¡ P (Q V ).
Theorem 3 If P 0 (¢) is strictly concave, then English-quantity auction dominates Vickrey-quantity auction.
Example 3: Consider the double-uniform newsvendor example. As noted in Example 2, P 0 (Q) = 2Q(1 ¡ Q), which is strictly concave, and c ¤ = 2 3
. From Theorem 3, the English auction that adopts P 0 (¢) and c ¤ is at least as good as the optimal Vickrey auction. The question is if English auction can be strictly better. The answer is yes.
Consider the following English auction. The buyer announces the QP function, Note that if c < 1=2, Q e (c) exceeds one. In this case, due to the requirement that quantity o®ers be at most 1, the auction becomes a¯xed-quantity auction (with only price competition). It is then straightforward to see that the following is the outcome of the above English auction: if C 2¸1 =2, the quantity delivered is Q = maxfQ o (C 1 ); Q e (C 2 )g and the payment is P (Q); otherwise, if C 2 < 1=2, then the quantity delivered is one unit and the payment is C 2 . A simulation shows that the buyer's expected pro¯t under the above English auction is about 0.48, which is strictly greater than what the buyer can achieve under Vickrey auction. 4 A careful reader may say that the above design is not really a pure quantity auction, because when the bidding reaches the maximum quantity of one unit, the suppliers are engaged in a¯xed-quantity auction. But a pure quantity auction is easily obtained. Simply let P (Q) = 1 2 (1 ¡ Q¡1 ² ) for Q > 1, where ² is a small number, and remove the restriction on quantity o®ers. Note that in this case, a supplier will never bid a quantity over 1 + ². And the winner is the supplier with the highest bid. This is a pure quantity English auction. As ² ! 0, this quantity auction converges to the above \hybrid" auction.
Price Auctions
An alternative solution to the variable-quantity procurement problem is a two-step mechanism. As before, the buyer gives a QP schedule, P (¢) with P (0) = 0. The suppliers compete for the supply contract (i.e., the given QP schedule) by submitting price o®ers (i.e., lump-sum fees) in an auction. This is step one, which produces a winner. In step two, the winning supplier determines the quantity to produce and deliver to the buyer. In contrast, the winning supplier and the input quantity are determined in one single step in quantity auctions. We use price auctions to refer to procurement strategies where the suppliers compete by submitting price o®ers (as opposed to quantity o®ers).
Our analysis of price auctions proceeds in two steps. First, we address the auction design problem facing the buyer for any given P (¢). Then, we consider the problem of¯nding an optimal P (¢) to maximize the buyer's expected pro¯ts.
The buyer's auction design problem is very much the same as the problem facing the auctioneer in a standard auction: the object for sale is the supply contract (i.e., P (¢)) and the suppliers are potential buyers of this object. How much is this object worth to supplier i, i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n? If he is awarded the supply contract, he faces a simple pro¯t maximization problem: choose Q to maximize P (Q) ¡ c i Q. De¯ne
Rede¯ne Q(c) = argmax Q¸0 P (Q) ¡ cQ. Therefore, the supply contract is worth v(c i ) def = v i to supplier i. Clearly, the lowest-cost supplier derives the highest value from the contract. Since the suppliers' marginal costs are independent draws from a common distribution, the values fv i g n i=1 are independent and identically distributed random variables. Therefore, the standard auction is of the independent, privatevalue kind, and there are many well-known optimal designs (see, e.g., Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981) ). For example, English auction, Dutch auction,¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction, and Vickrey auction are all optimal. (We will sometimes refer to these auction forms collectively as the common auction forms.)
Suppose the buyer uses English auction: the suppliers openly bid on the price they are willing to pay for the contract P (¢), and the supplier with the highest bid wins the contract and pays his bid. It is well known that the supplier with the highest valuation (i.e., the lowest marginal cost) wins the contract and pays a price equal to the valuation of the second-lowest-cost supplier. Let
where C k is the kth lowest cost. So the fee the buyer collects by \selling" the supply contract is V 2 .
5
To determine an optimal QP schedule, consider the buyer's cash°ow. First, the buyer collects a fee from the winning supplier in the amount of V 2 . Then the winning supplier determines the production quantity. Since the winning supplier must be the supplier with the lowest marginal cost C 1 , the buyer's input quantity is Q(C 1 ), which generates revenues R(Q(C 1 )) for the buyer but costs her P (Q(C 1 )). Consequently, the buyer's pro¯ts are
The expected value of (V 1 ¡ V 2 ), which is the winning supplier's pro¯ts, has a familiar form. Take any c with Q(c) > 0. Writing v(c) = P (Q(c)) ¡ cQ(c) and
From the¯rst-order condition for the optimization problem in (10), P 0 (Q(c)) = c.
Therefore, v 0 (c) = ¡Q(c). On the other hand, for any c with Q(c) = 0, v(c) = 0 and thus v 0 (c) = 0, which is also equal to ¡Q(c). Consequently,
Using the conditional probability density function of C 2 given C 1 = c (see Appendix I), we have
A reader versed in auction theory would immediately think that the optimal design should include a reserve price, a minimum price acceptable to the auctioneer. For now, let us assume that there is not such a reserve price. A remark towards the end of this subsection explains why a reserve price is not needed here.
which, after changing the order of integration twice (¯rst between x and y, and then between c and x), becomes
Note that the above expression is the same as the expected total pro¯ts of the suppliers in the sealed, high-bid auction.
Substituting (12) for the expected value of (V 1 ¡ V 2 ), we have from (11)
which is exactly the same as (7), the buyer's expected pro¯ts in the sealed, high-bid, quantity auction. Applying the Revenue Equivalence Theorem to the above standard auction, where the supply contract is \sold" to the highest bidder, we see that the buyer's expected pro¯ts remain unchanged if any of the other common auction forms is used. Below, we shall con¯ne ourselves to price auctions that use one of the common auction forms.
equals the buyer's maximum expected pro¯ts (see Theorem 1). The QP schedule that implements Q ¤ (¢) in a price auction, denoted by P ¤¤ (¢), is the solution to
This immediately leads to the following observations: P ¤¤ (Q) is increasing in Q; it is concave because Q ¤ (c) is decreasing in c; and it is independent of the number of bidders.
Theorem 4 Price auctions maximize the buyer's expected pro¯ts, if the QP schedule is P ¤¤ (¢) and the winning supplier is chosen via any of the following common auction forms: English auction, Dutch auction,¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction, and Vickrey auction. Moreover, P ¤¤ (Q) is concave and increasing in Q, and is independent of the number of potential suppliers.
The QP schedule in optimal price auctions has an interesting interpretation in the newsvendor setting. Consider the newsvendor problem described in x3.1. Take
where the inverse functionH ¡1 (¢) is well-de¯ned becauseH(¢) is increasing. Therefore
Now suppose the suppliers' costs are drawn from the uniform distribution, i.e.,
From (13),
This QP schedule can be interpreted as a returns contract: the buyer pays the (winning) supplier a wholesale price of w = (p + c)=2 for each unit of input delivered, and in case there is excess supply after demand is realized, the buyer can return the excess inventory to the supplier for a partial refund of p=2. (If c = 0, it becomes a full refund.) Under this contract, and assuming the returned inventory has no value to suppliers, a supplier, if he wins, earns the following expected revenue (as a function of the production quantity Q):
On the other hand, if c = 0, P ¤¤ (Q) becomes a revenue-sharing contract: the buyer pre-announces that half of her revenues will be transferred to the winning supplier and invites the suppliers to submit their price o®ers for such a deal, with the winning supplier being the one willing to pay the highest price.
Example 4: For the double-uniform newsvendor example,
The reader may recall that this QP schedule was used in Example 3 to demonstrate that the buyer strictly prefers English-quantity auction to Vickreyquantity auction.
We close this subsection with two remarks. Remark 1. Price auctions are typically not regular in the sense of Myerson (1981) .
For example, consider the double-uniform newsvendor example. Given P ¤¤ (¢) as the QP schedule,
The range of v(c) is thus [0;
which is not an increasing function of z, failing the regularity test.
Remark 2. As is evident from Theorem 4, an optimal price auction does not require the auctioneer (i.e., the buyer) to impose a reservation value. Now suppose the buyer sets such a reservation value, denoted by v ¤ . So only those suppliers whose valuations are above v ¤ will¯nd it worthwhile to enter the auction. Let c ¤ be the corresponding marginal cost, i.e., v ¤ = v(c ¤ ). A lengthy derivation, which we omit here, leads to the following expression for the buyer's expected pro¯ts as a function of c ¤ :
Note that given P ¤¤ (¢), Q(x) = Q ¤ (x) and thus the above integrand is nonnegative for all x 2 [c; c]. Thus c ¤ = c is optimal. In other words, the buyer should not be concerned with setting a reserve price in a price auction as long as the QP function is chosen optimally. On the other hand, if the QP function is not set optimally, a reserve price might be necessary. For example, suppose P (Q) = R(Q) for all Q. Then
The resulting expression for ¦(c ¤ ) is, interestingly, exactly the same as the buyer's expected pro¯ts under the Vickrey-quantity auction (see (9)), which, in the case of the double-uniform newsvendor example, is maximized with c ¤ = be conducted in an English auction, a Dutch auction, a¯rst-price, sealed-bid auction, or a Vickrey auction. This°exibility is lost when we con¯ne ourselves to quantity auctions: only the sealed, high-bid auction and the Dutch auction are optimal. Moreover, the QP schedule in an optimal price auction is concave, increasing, and independent of the number of bidders. But in an optimal quantity auction, the QP function may actually decrease, and it depends on the number of bidders (see Example 1). Therefore, the QP function in price auctions is more \intuitive" (a supplier is paid more if he delivers more) and more \detail-free" (the buyer does not have to know the exact number of potential suppliers when designing the auction). Finally, as mentioned, the QP function in price auctions can sometimes be interpreted as common supply contracts such as revenue-sharing contracts and returns contracts. One potential advantage of quantity auctions is, however, that the winning supplier and the delivery quantity are determined in a single step.
Value of Risk Pooling
Risk pooling refers to the practice of combining di®erent inventory locations (and thus pooling demands). The traditional newsvendor model, where the per-unit purchase price for the input is exogenously given, is often used to illustrate the bene¯ts of risk pooling. Here we consider the value of risk pooling when there are multiple, competing suppliers with private marginal costs.
Consider the newsvendor problem described in x3.1. Assume that the demand D is normally distributed with mean ¹ and standard deviation ¾. As this assumption implies the possibility of negative demand, we modify the revenue function accordingly:
Recall that Q ¤ (x) is the solution to max Q¸0 R(Q) ¡H(x)Q and c ¤ is the minimum 
(Here we implicitly used the approximation that R(0) ¼ 0.) The above expression can be written in the following familiar form:
where Á(¢) is the density function of the standard normal.
The following approximation simpli¯es analysis. From the de¯nition of c ¤ , if
Note that the value of c ¤ depends on the demand distribution (via G (0)).
But this dependence must be weak because for the normal distribution to be a reasonable descriptor of demand, G(0) ¼ 0. Consequently, we introduce the following
The approximate c ¤ is now independent of the demand distribution. As a result, the values of a and b in (14) are independent of the demand distribution. The following analysis is based on this approximation.
To illustrate the value of risk pooling, suppose, for example, there are two identical retailers (newsvendors), facing iid demands. The common demand distribution is N(¹; ¾). The retailers have access to the same set of potential suppliers. As independent retailers, they each make expected pro¯ts a¹ ¡ b¾, with 2a¹ ¡ 2b¾ being the total between them. Now suppose the retailers merge into a single entity, which faces an aggregated demand that is normal with mean 2¹ and standard deviation p 2¾ and thus earns expected pro¯ts 2a¹ ¡ b p 2¾. The value of risk pooling is the increase in total pro¯ts due to the merger, i.e., b(2¡ p 2)¾. Note that the coe±cient b completely captures the value of risk pooling, which only depends on the retail price p and the supply-side characteristics, i.e., the number of suppliers n and the cost distribution
)). Note that µ(¢) is independent of n.
Lemma 4 If
for all x 2 [c; c], then µ 0 (x) > (resp., <) 0 for all
Proof: First note that © ¡1 (¢) is an increasing function with © ¡1 (
) is nonnegative for all x and decreases as x increases. The lemma follows since Á(y) is decreasing in y for y¸0. The other scenario can be shown similarly. 2
Theorem 5 The value of risk pooling decreases (resp., increases) as the supply-side competition increases, i.e., n increases, in a high-margin (resp., low-margin) product market, i.e.,
for all x 2 [c; c].
Proof: Note that 
Value of Perfect Demand Information
Consider again the newsvendor problem. An implicit assumption here is that trading between the newsvendor and a supplier, if it occurs, takes place before the endcustomer demand is realized. In other words, the system operates in the make-tostock regime (MTS). Let ¦ MT S be the newsvendor's maximum expected pro¯ts in this scenario.
Another often-observed regime is the so-called make-to-order system (MTO), where demand is observed before the procurement/production decision is made. In the context of the newsvendor problem, the question becomes: given that demand is (14) for a and b). Therefore, V P DI = b¾. Consequently, Theorem 5 also applies to VPDI.
Quantity Decision Rights
The optimal auction designs for the variable-quantity, reverse auction problem suggest that the ultimate decision on the buyer's input quantity should come from both sides of the trade. For example, in price auctions, the buyer sets the auction rules (e.g., the QP function and the bidding mechanism), and the winning supplier makes thē nal quantity choice by using his (private) cost information. In reality, however, we often see that either the buyer makes the quantity decision all by herself and seeks the most cost-e®ective supplier, or the quantity decision is delegated to the chosen supplier, such as in Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) and other consignment-type arrangements. In this section, we are interested in the allocation of quantity decision rights and how it a®ects the buyer's expected pro¯ts.
We con¯ne our study to the newsvendor problem with the following modi¯ca-tion. If at the end of the selling season there is unsatis¯ed demand, additional input can be procured from a spot market at a unit cost of c s . 6 The spot market has in¯nite capacity, is capable of instantaneous delivery, and is available to all parties, i.e., the newsvendor and the suppliers. Assume that c s < p. Therefore, any reasonable procurement strategy should not leave any demand unsatis¯ed. Without loss of generality, assume c s¸c .
Buyer Managed Inventory (BMI)
In this case, the newsvendor¯rst decides the input quantity Q and then runs an auction to¯nd the minimum-cost trade. If this auction produces a trade, let B be the payment the newsvendor pays for the input, which becomes the newsvendor's inventory at the beginning of the selling season. If the total demand D exceeds Q, the excess demand is satis¯ed by buying from the spot market. On the other hand, if the auction fails to generate a trade, the newsvendor will satisfy all demand by acquiring from the spot market. Therefore, the newsvendor's pro¯ts can be written as
Observe that the problem facing the newsvendor is equivalent to a single-unit, reverse auction, where the \single-unit" refers to the batch of input quantity Q, and the selling price of this \single-unit" is R(Q). Note that supplier i's cost of producing this \single-unit" is c i Q, i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n. Let SURA(p; c i ; i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n) be the buyer's maximum expected pro¯ts in the single-unit, reverse auction de¯ned in x2. Thus Consequently, from (15),
It remains for the newsvendor to choose an optimal value for Q. This can be a complicated problem. Fortunately, for the purpose of this section, it is unnecessary to¯nd the optimal Q.
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI)
Under a VMI arrangement, a supplier chosen by the newsvendor is responsible for satisfying the demand D in its entirety. In return, the supplier receives a fee from the newsvendor for his service. The newsvendor seeks a supplier to minimize her fee. The newsvendor runs an auction to determine which supplier, if any, is given the VMI contract. Regardless of the outcome of this auction, the demand D will be satis¯ed in its entirety and the newsvendor will pocket expected revenues p¹. Her costs, however, depend on the auction's outcome. If the auction fails to \sell" the VMI contract, then the newsvendor has to purchase from the spot market, incurring expected costs c s ¹. Otherwise, the costs are the payment made to the winning supplier. Therefore, the newsvendor is in the same position as that of an auctioneer who wants to sell an object, i.e., the VMI contract, to the highest bidder, with bidder i's valuation of the object being equal to ¡x i , i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n, and the auctioneer's own valuation of the object being equal to ¡c s ¹. Consequently, the newsvendor's maximum expected pro¯ts can be expressed as It is worth mentioning that if the newsvendor does not impose a reservation value in auctioning o® the VMI contract, then the system is e±cient, i.e., the expected system-wide pro¯ts are maximized. To see this, simply check that the lowest-cost supplier always wins the contract and his production quantity is what a central planner with complete information would do.
Shared Decision Rights (SDR)
In this case, the newsvendor runs an auction at the beginning of the selling season to determine the input quantity Q and the payment B. If demand exceeds inventory, i.e., 
Theorem 7 The newsvendor prefers SDR to VMI. The probability density function of C k , k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n, is
and the probability density function of C 2 given C 1 = x is f (C 2 = yjC 1 = x) = (n ¡ 1)F 0 (y)(1 ¡ F (y))
n¡2
(1 ¡ F (x)) n¡1 ; x • y • c:
If F (x) = x for x 2 [0; 1], then
; and V ar[C k ] = k(n ¡ k + 1) (n + 1) 2 (n + 2) ; k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; n:
These results are often derived in standard probability textbooks.
To show E[H(C 1 )] = E[C 2 ],¯rst note that
Integrating by parts, and using F (c) = 0 and F (c) = 1, we have
